Suchergebnisse

Le droit s'est avéré être un utile relais, complément ou alternative à l'action militaire. Certains conflits ne se pensent désormais plus en termes d'espaces géographiques à conquérir ou à défendre, mais davantage dans une logique spatiale de régulation des conduites. Une des illustrations les plus frappantes de cette « guerre par le droit » est sans conteste la stratégie de sanctions économiques des États-Unis à l'égard de certains États ennemis ou dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme. C'est par une extraterritorialité juridique souvent contestable et fondée sur la puissance de leur marché, qu'ils ont réussi à discipliner toute une série d'acteurs économiques afin d'exporter leur politique étrangère. Il s'est ainsi avéré que les espaces juridiques prennent appui sur des espaces économiques qui ne coïncident plus nécessairement avec le territoire de l'État.

The risks associated with sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) transactions are essentially two-fold: political, to the extent that SWFs could be used as the armed wing of States' foreign policy, and economic, since there is a risk of public subsidization or other types of market distortions through their investments. It is within this framework that the idea of international best practices aimed at a better regulation of SWFs was envisaged. This led to the adoption of the "Generally Accepted Principles and Practices" for SWFs, also labelled as the "Santiago Principles". While the Santiago Principles may be useful for a better regulation of the relationship between fund managers and owners, they are nevertheless absolutely futile for considering and protecting the interests of the host States of sovereign investments. Thus, the Santiago Principles go against their founding objective. To this extent, the Santiago Principles shall not be regarded as a genuine form of international regulation, but rather as a veneer of respectability to improve the way recipient States perceive sovereign investors.

The risks associated with sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) transactions are essentially two-fold: political, to the extent that SWFs could be used as the armed wing of States' foreign policy, and economic, since there is a risk of public subsidization or other types of market distortions through their investments. It is within this framework that the idea of international best practices aimed at a better regulation of SWFs was envisaged. This led to the adoption of the "Generally Accepted Principles and Practices" for SWFs, also labelled as the "Santiago Principles". While the Santiago Principles may be useful for a better regulation of the relationship between fund managers and owners, they are nevertheless absolutely futile for considering and protecting the interests of the host States of sovereign investments. Thus, the Santiago Principles go against their founding objective. To this extent, the Santiago Principles shall not be regarded as a genuine form of international regulation, but rather as a veneer of respectability to improve the way recipient States perceive sovereign investors.

À l'instar d'Alstom et de BNP Paribas, plusieurs entreprises européennes ont été poursuivies ces dernières années aux États-Unis pour violation des dispositifs anticorruption (FCPA) ou à ceux relatifs aux embargos. Ces procédures ont été vivement critiquées à l'étranger pour le montant parfois exorbitant des sanctions pécuniaires appliquées mais aussi pour leur dimension extraterritoriale, dans la mesure où elles visaient des activités conduites en dehors du territoire des États-Unis et impliquant des personnes non américaines. Instinctivement perçue comme déraisonnable ou excessive, l'extraterritorialité américaine – qui se manifeste à présent par de nouveaux supports (usage du dollar, circulation via Internet de contenus sur des réseau ou serveurs localisés aux États-Unis, etc.) – mérite toutefois d'être évaluée différemment selon qu'elle concerne la mise en oeuvre des mesures d'embargo ou de dispositifs anti-corruption car ces derniers peuvent en effet s'appuyer sur des règles internationales qui confèrent aux États une compétence plus étendue pour la poursuite de ces infractions. Les réponses qui peuvent être apportées à cette extraterritorialité plus offensive sont également différentes selon qu'il s'agit des sanctions unilatérales ou des dispositifs anti-corruption. Il est aussi important de se pencher dans ce cadre sur les procédures singulières de justice négociée pratiquées aux États-Unis par le biais desquelles ces sanctions sont prononcées.

Longtemps essentiellement confiné au seul marché national, le capitalisme d'État se singularise dorénavant par sa projection internationale, notamment par l'intermédiaire d'entreprises d'État et de fonds souverains multipliant les acquisitions à l'étranger. Lorsqu'elles concernent des secteurs sensibles, ces opérations peuvent être perçues défavorablement par les États d'accueil craignant l'appropriation d'actifs stratégiques par des puissances étrangères. Les conditions économiques de ces investissements souverains génèrent aussi des craintes de distorsion de concurrence en raison des subventions dont ces acteurs bénéficient pour leurs acquisitions. Ces risques politiques et économiques ne sont toutefois pas appréhendés de façon appropriée en droit international économique.

The recent period has been rich in events highlighting the shortcomings of mechanisms for managing sovereign debt crises. Both the difficulties which Greece has been going through and the many litigious consequences of Argentina's 2001 default have revealed the obstacles to implementing effective restructuring schemes and to neutralising proceedings brought by creditors not wishing to be part of them. Against this impression of disorder and impediments to the introduction of bankruptcy proceedings for states, the borrowing agreement appears to be the most suitable instrument for ensuring orderly management of problems of state solvency. In this context, it seems legitimate to question the emergence of a ' public order of sovereign debt' the keystone of which would be this borrowing agreement between states and their creditors.

Introduction -- Part I Sovereign Immunity from Comparative Perspective: Weak v. Strong Immunity Regimes -- Customary International Law and the U.S. Approach to Foreign Sovereign Immunity -- Sovereign Immunity from a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Germany -- The New 2015 Russian Law on Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States: If You Want Peace, Prepare for War? -- Sovereign Immunity: Perspectives from Sub-Saharan Africa -- State Immunity Regimes in Latin America -- How Absolute is the Absolute State Immunity? Towards Judicialization of State Immunity in China -- The Law of State Immunity and The Role of International Courts: Looking for The Guiding Star -- Part II International Customary Law of Sovereign Immunity, Human Righ.-ts and Counter-terrorism -- Can Human Rights Overcome State Immunity? Critical Assessment of The Role of Domestic Courts in The Customary Law Creating Process -- Shrinking of Jurisdictional Immunities and Victims' Rights: From Separation To Sinergy -- Assessing State Immunity Through the Lenses of The European Court of Human Rights: Embassy Employment Disputes as Test Bench for Restricted Immunity -- Terrorism Exception to State Immunities – an Emerging Customary Norm of International Law? -- The United States Hegemony and Reshaping the Norms of State Immunity for International Crimes -- Part III Sovereign Immunity of States and Their Financial Obligations -- Cross-Influences in Public and Private International Law: On The (New?) EU Interpretation of Heads of Jurisdiction Over The (Traditional?) Understandings of Acta Iure Imperii -- Sovereign Debt and Immunity -- Foreign Central Banks and Immunity from Execution: Too Sovereign To Be Sued? -- Expanding Immunity from Execution Through the Backdoor: The French Example -- Conclusion.

"The last twenty years have witnessed an astonishing transformation: the fight against corruption has grown from a handful of local undertakings into a truly global effort. Law occupies a central role in that effort and this timely book assesses the challenges faced in using law as it too morphs from a handful of local rules into a global regime. The book presents the perspectives of a global array of scholars, of policy makers, and of practitioners. Topics range from critical theoretical understandings of the global regime as a whole, to regional and local experiences in implementing and influencing the regime, including specific legal techniques such as deferred prosecution agreements, addressing corruption issues in dispute resolution, whistleblower protection, civil and administrative prosecutions, as well as blocking statutes. The book also includes discussions of the future shape of the global regime, the emergence of transnational compliance standards, and discussions by leaders of international organizations that take a leading role in the transnationalization of anti-corruption law. The Transnationalization of Anti-Corruption Law deals with the most salient aspects of the global anti-corruption regime. It is written by people who contribute to the structure of the regime, who practice within the regime, and who study the regime. It is written for anyone interested in corruption or corruption control in general, anyone with a general interest in jurisprudence or in international law, and especially anyone who is interested in critical thinking and analysis of how law can control corruption in a global context"--